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but an argument could be made that Glory is. Though not
so complex a character as Jack, Glory is engaged in her
own quest for significance, hurt and grieving over her own
recent past, searching for peace and a sense of well-being
in her life. She fears and hopes that she may have come
home for good to Gilead. To her surprise, Jack ministers
to her in her struggle just as she ministers so patiently and
gently to him. Her epiphany at the very end of the novel,
her recognition of the goodness of her life, is immensely
satisfying.
Home is not the kind of novel that rides along blithely
on its plot; it moves slowly, character driven. At some
point you may look back over the last fifty pages you have
read and wonder if anything significant has happened.

But then you recognize that you have been drawn
forward, captivated by the subtle growth and change in
the relationship between Glory and Jack or Jack’s ongoing
struggle to understand his relationship with his father.
Does Home measure up to Gilead? I think it does—as
a work of art. But I do not think it will be as popular
as Gilead, for even though Home wrestles with more
puzzling and challenging questions than Gilead does, its
slow pace will put some people off. Nevertheless, it is a
fine companion piece to Gilead. Both novels move with
a patient gentleness; both are inhabited by characters one
would like to have as friends; and both evoke a sense of
wonder (and sometimes fear) about the deep joys and
sorrows at the core of human existence.
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Reviewed by Keith C. Sewell, Professor of History at Dordt College
Almost sixty years ago, Herbert Butterfield published
The Origins of Modern Science (1949), a book that more than
many others helped numerous students make the history
of science central to their understanding of the history of
western civilization. Butterfield’s work was significant for its
“thinking cap” and “lantern slide” metaphors, which were so
suggestive to Thomas S. Kuhn of “paradigm change” fame.
Butterfield also maintained that by uncritically reading our
notions of “science” back into the times of late-medieval
and early-modern Europe, we could be ensnaring ourselves
in all manner of anachronistic misperceptions from the
crude to the subtle. Butterfield was not, of course, without
his precursors and contemporaries—the Americans
George Sarton (1884-1956) and Lynn Thorndike (18821965), and European giants such as Pierre Duhem (18611916) and Alexandre Koyré (1892-1964), had already made
important contributions. Butterfield warned against the
fallacies of anachronism in the history of science as in
other branches of historical study. In the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, for example, we can find astronomy
and astrology intertwined in a complex web of conjecture,
discovery, and debate. This complex web has led some to
seek the “origins” of our truly “modern” science in the
nineteenth century—after all, while the word “scientia” is of
classical lineage, “scientist” comes to us from the century
of Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley. Yet such a stance
is less than satisfactory. At the very least, it would seem
to under-appreciate the deeper continuities of history; our
“modern science” is, in truth, the result of a long process
of historical maturation.
In this work, Stephen Gaukroger, Professor of History
of Philosophy and History of Science at the University of
Sydney, Australia, demonstrates two: to account for how
modern science emerged in the West, and to explain why
scientific knowledge came to be regarded as the basis upon

which all other claims to knowledge should be assessed.
These questions cannot be settled with reference to the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries alone. Moreover, as
soon as the longer term is taken into consideration, the
immense impact of Aristotelian thinking in the latemedieval and early-modern periods must be traversed
with care. Accordingly, Gaukroger takes the long view,
commencing his discussions with the Paris condemnations
of Aristotle in 1210 and 1277 (70 f.). In truth, the synthesis
of Aristotelian natural philosophy and Christian theology
that we so rightly associate with Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274)
enjoyed no smooth path to official (Papal) sanction as
latter-day “Thomism”; instead, it encountered repeated
challenges from both old Platonism and as well as from
varieties of the new Nominalism (80 f.).
This volume traverses the broad late-medieval and
early-modern periods. It ends with the beginnings of
modern-style reflections on the antiquity of man, which
also anticipated the development of scientific geology
(496-503), to a point where we find ourselves on the brink
of Newton’s Principia Mathematica of 1687 (352-6, 462-8).
Gaukroger is nothing but thorough; he peers
into the nooks and crannies, explores half-forgotten
byways, and surveys dead-ends, for these all exhibit their
instructive moments. He helps keep us from the pitfalls
of anachronism by using the term “natural philosophy,”
reminding us that this was not a single uniform enterprise
but exhibited diverse articulations in fields such as
mathematics, mechanics and optics (35, 253 ff.). As befits
the author of a full length biography (see his Descartes: An
Intellectual Biography, 1995), Gaukroger is particularly strong
on Descartes (1596-1650), whose philosophical project
was a response to the perceived failure of Thomism.
That failure was already evident in the writings of Pietro
Pomponazzi (1462-1525), who had decisively called into
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question the tenability of Aristotelian natural philosophy
“in its Christianized version” to “serve in the role of a
philosophical foundation for . . . systematic theology”
(102).
The relationship between the Christian religion and
the pagan thinking of classical Greece remains one of
the greatest questions confronting Christian thought
and scholarship. Gaukroger does not write explicitly as a
Christian, but he is more fully aware of the problems than
many contemporary Christians (7, cf. 50). More readily
than some of our contemporary scholastic theologians,
he recognizes that so-called “Christian Aristotelianism”
is an “amalgam” and not intrinsically Christian (77, 80).
His assessment is that Catholicism’s adoption of Thomism
as “the official Church philosophy” represented a “finely
balanced compromise” ultimately destined to unravel (823). As he puts it later, “Aristotelian natural philosophy …
never presented a wholly satisfactory conception of the
natural realm as far as Christian theology was concerned,
because it failed to capture the single origin of the natural
world …” (507). Only when “natural philosophy” learned
to abandon Aristotle (186, 324) was it possible for what
we call “scientific progress” to emerge and achieve a
continuous momentum. Contra-Aristotle, men such
as Francis Bacon (1561-1626) came to understand the
truths of “natural philosophy” as practical and not merely
contemplative (228). The result was an outlook that we can
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recognize as more decidedly modern, marked by a shift
from how best to live in the world to how the world might
be changed for the better.
For all his insights, not all of Gaukroger’s assertions
will pass unchallenged. Certainly, the first Jewish Christians,
both at home and across the Diaspora, were subject to
varying levels of Hellenization, but not all readers will
be ready to concur that the canonical authors Paul and
John should be numbered among the Hellenizers (61, cf.
83). There is an issue of New Testament interpretation
here that should not pass unchallenged (see also 3778 and 397-9), especially as Gaukroger adumbrates his
view that it was not the physical sciences that eventually
were to threaten the faith but the emergence of a certain
kind of historical-mindedness (3, 23), perhaps because—yet
also in spite of—Christianity itself being so historically
grounded. And across the extensive vistas he commands,
it is not altogether clear that our author here achieves his
objective of explaining precisely why scientific knowledge
came to be widely regarded as the basis upon which all
other claims to knowledge would be assessed by the end
of the seventeenth century. Gaukroger is philosophically
formidable, but something seems to be missing here
historically. However, the “Preface” informs us that this is
but the first of five projected volumes, so patience will be
in order as we expectantly await his conclusions.

